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A B S T R A C T
Informal caregiving is a potentially attractive alternative to formal care but may entail health costs for the
caregiver. We examine the mental and physical health impact of providing informal care and disentangle the
caregiving effect – the effect of caring for someone in need – from the family effect – the effect of caring about
someone in need. We account for the main sources of endogeneity in the caregiving decision using Arellano-
Bond difference GMM models. We use four waves (2010–2013) of panel data from the Dutch Study on
Transitions in Employment, Ability and Motivation (STREAM).
We find that caregiving harms the mental health of caregivers; the effect is more prominent for spousal
caregivers. On top of this, a negative health shock of a family member also has a direct negative effect on mental
health, providing evidence of a family effect. Our findings thus highlight that the total effect of having a sick
relative may be underestimated when the family effect is not adequately accounted for. As the caregiving effect
differs substantially between various types of caregivers, policies to cushion these effects should specifically
target those subgroups of caregivers that carry the largest burden of informal caregiving.
Introduction
In most Western countries, the demand for long-term care (LTC) is
expected to keep rising in the decades to come. For instance, in the
Netherlands the demand for LTC is projected to grow at an average
annual rate of 1.6% between 2014 and 2030 (Eggink et al., 2016). Part
of this growing demand is likely to be met by informal care, i.e. by
unpaid care provided by relatives and friends. While the costs of in-
formal caregiving are typically low for the recipient, they may be
substantial for the caregiver and society. Various studies found that the
stress and physical strain involved in informal caregiving risks hurting
the health of caregivers (e.g. Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003). Many of
these studies, however, used non-representative samples or focused on
the provision of care for a specific disease (Hirst, 2004).
While the recent literature has moved towards estimating the im-
pact of informal caregiving using larger, representative datasets, two
main challenges of adequate empirical identification of these effects
have emerged. A first challenge relates to the potential endogeneity
between the decision to provide informal care and one’s own health.
Persons with lower health expectations might for example be more
inclined to take up the caregiver role for their parents (Schulz, 1990).
The other way around, a minimum level of health is required to be able
to carry out caregiving tasks, which prevents individuals in very poor
health from providing care. In addition, omitted variables may lead to
bias when unobserved variables like personality affect both the pro-
pensity of providing care and the health of the caregiver.
A second challenge, which has received limited attention thus far, is
dealing with the notion that two distinct effects may be present in si-
tuations of ill-health of a relative: the family effect and the caregiving
effect. The family effect refers to the impact of caring about a person and,
if living together, the consequences of taking over regular household
chores. It is different from the caregiving effect, which is the effect of
caring for a person in need. Irrespective of care provision, experiencing a
health decline of a loved one can have a negative effect on one’s own
health or well-being (Amirkhanyan and Wolf, 2006; Bobinac et al., 2010).
It is important to make this distinction between the caregiving effect
and the family effect, as addressing them adequately would require
different government interventions. Respite care, for instance, could
alleviate the caregiving effect, but offers no solution to the family effect
of worrying about an ill family member. As the caregiving effect and the
family effect often occur simultaneously, it is difficult to disentangle
them. Yet, not controlling for the family effect might lead to over-
estimation of the caregiving effect.
This paper aims to improve understanding of the health effects ex-
perienced by informal caregivers by separately estimating both effects.
In contrast to some earlier studies, we do not apply instrumental
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variables to estimate the caregiving effect because the validity of the
instruments used in previous work can be questioned, and strong and
valid instruments are not readily available. Instead, we reduce en-
dogeneity concerns by using Arellano-Bond difference GMM models to
control for existing health differences in a first-differences regression.
While most papers focus on either parental or spousal caregiving,
we separately estimate the caregiving effect and the family effect for
various groups of caregivers. There may be various reasons why the
impact of caregiving differs between these care types. As spousal
caregivers tend to be older, they often have fewer physical and psy-
chological resources to deal with stress related to caregiving (Pinquart
and Sörensen, 2003). Furthermore, differences in the level of care
provision can be large drivers of differences in stress between spousal
and parental caregivers (Pinquart and Sorensen, 2011).
Earlier work on health effects of informal caregiving
A number of studies have attempted to address endogeneity pro-
blems when evaluating the health effects of informal caregiving by
using instrumental variables (IVs), fixed effects (FE) methods or sta-
tistical matching (see Table A1 in the appendix for an overview). The
first group of studies used IVs to estimate the impact of informal care
provision (Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; Do et al., 2015; Heger, 2016)
and found significant negative effects of informal caregiving on the
caregiver’s health. The IVs employed in these studies all relate to the
health of one’s parents. The risk of these instruments lies in their po-
tential violation of the exclusion restriction; when a family effect is
present, a health shock of a family member is correlated directly to the
caregiver’s health. Using health of a family member as IV for informal
caregiving could therefore overestimate the effect of caregiving on
health by attributing the entire difference in health between individuals
with and without ill family members to caregiving.
The second group of studies, most closely linked to the set-up of the
current paper, aims to estimate a causal impact by controlling for or
matching on a large set of covariates. These studies rely on the assumption
that they are able to capture all covariates that affect the caregiving de-
cision to make the conditional independence assumption hold. While this
is a strong assumption, it might be preferable considering worries related
to the validity of IVs. Van den Berg et al. (2014) used FE models on an
Australian dataset and found significant negative effects of caregiving on
subjective wellbeing. Using FE models they controlled for time constant
heterogeneity, however they did not consider selection into caregiving
based on time-variant elements such as previous health. The studies
making use of matching (Brenna and Di Novi, 2016; de Zwart et al., 2017;
Schmitz and Westphal, 2015), addressed endogeneity of caregiving by
statistically matching caregivers and non-caregivers on observable char-
acteristics. By matching on pre-treatment variables, these papers make it
credible that treatment is random conditional on controls and hence that
an average treatment effect on the treated can be identified. All three
papers found negative effects of caregiving on mental health.
Thus far, two studies specifically considered the family effect. Do
et al. (2015) aimed to avoid picking up the family effect by only fo-
cusing on (i) physical health effects and (ii) females providing care to
their parents-in-law. They found negative health effects of providing
informal care, but might face difficulties in isolating the family effect
from the caregiving effect. For example, as mental and physical health
could affect each other, stress related to the family effect may induce
physical health problems. Heger (2016) estimated the family effect by
including an indicator of poor health of a parent in the model and found
a negative effect of poor health of family members on the health of the
potential caregiver.
Methods
To deal with the potential endogeneity between caregiving and own
health, we start from the economic intuition behind the caregiving
decision as presented by De Zwart et al. (2017). According to their
model, a set of elements affect the caregiving decision. The first one
relates to personal ability, both reflected in wage and health. Persons
with a higher ability might, for example, prefer paid work to providing
informal care. Second, availability of other types of informal and formal
care might affect the caregiving decision. Household income and size
could for example reflect someone's possibilities to purchase formal care
or to transfer caregiving duties to family members. Lastly, non-monetary
factors such as cultural factors might affect the caregiving decision.
We account for these factors that shape the caregiving decision in
three ways. First, we use a first-difference model to control for time-
invariant personal characteristics, like personality traits and education.
Second, we deal with differential selection into caregiving by health
status by conditioning on the lagged health status. Controlling for
lagged health not only deals with reverse causality but also helps to
mitigate the issue of unobserved characteristics (cf. Lechner, 2009).
Variations in time-variant factors that are potentially affecting current
health status of the respondents occurring in t−1 and earlier are likely
to have also affected lagged health and thus need not to be controlled
for anymore. Hence, we assume that no event affected both the pro-
pensity to care and one's own health in the past year.
To include a lagged variable while controlling for time-invariant
unobservables, we use the Arellano-Bond (1991) (A-B) estimation tech-
nique. Including pre-treatment health status in a regular FE or first-dif-
ference model is not possible as the lagged dependent variables correlate
with the fixed effects in the error term and would give rise to dynamic
panel bias. This bias could affect our estimates of the lagged dependent
variable, as well as the coefficients of our other independent variables,
especially when the dataset contains few waves but many observations
(Nickell, 1981). In the A-B first-differences model, the lagged difference
in health status H H( )it 1 is instrumented by deeper lags of health
(starting with health two waves earlier: Hit 2). We can use Hit 2 as an
instrument for H( )it 1 because Hit 2 is correlated with H( )it 1 but not
with it as long as the error terms are not serially correlated. Following
Arellano and Bond (1991), we do not only use the second lag of health,
but all available deeper lags of health as instruments. As we have four
waves of data, we can include the second and third lag.
Third, we control for remaining observed time-varying factors re-
lated to the caregiving decision and own health by including covariates
(such as income and marital status) into our models. The main differ-
ence between this study and prior studies is that we include measures to
capture the family effect in the model. Based on the existing literature,
we cannot conceive other important, time-varying factors affecting own
health and the caregiving decision.
The resulting dynamic panel data model is estimated using a dif-
ference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression.1 The model
is specified as follows:= + + + +H H IC HF Xit i t it it it it1 , 1 2 3 4 (1)
The change in health Hit is dependent on the change in one's health
status observed one year before, Hi t, 1; on ICit, which indicates the
change of the informal care provision status; on HFit, which refers to a
change in the health state of the individual’s partner or close family
member,2 as well as a vector of changes in individual time-varying
characteristics, Xit. All time-invariant individual characteristics are
factored out by differencing. Our main parameters of interest are ,2
indicating the caregiving effect, and ,3 indicating the family effect.
1 We present robust twostep estimates using the Stata command xtabond2
(Roodman, 2006)
2 The caregiving effect and the family effect might reinforce each other, for
example, when care provision becomes more challenging due to severe illness
of the care recipient. Adding an interaction term to the model, we indeed ob-
serve a positive interaction between the two effects. We do not include this
interaction term in the models presented in this paper, as the approach is highly
data demanding.
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Data
We use the Dutch Study on Transitions in Employment, Ability and
Motivation (STREAM) panel survey, which includes four annual waves of
data ranging from 2010 to 2013. It collects extensive information on
determinants of transitions into and out of employment and of work
productivity among persons aged 45–64 years. This is also the age group
providing most informal care in the Netherlands (Gezondheidsmonitor,
2016). The STREAM sample is stratified at baseline on age and work
status and is drawn from an existing internet panel (Ybema et al., 2014).
In the first wave, 15,118 persons responded to the survey. In later waves,
this original sample was invited to participate again without replace-
ment. Attrition is fairly low: in total almost two-thirds (64%) of the
sample responded to all four surveys. The panel data are linked at the
individual level to administrative data for all registered inhabitants in the
Netherlands obtained via Statistics Netherlands.3
Sample
From the 15,118 first wave respondents, we select a subsample of
individuals who could potentially provide informal care to their parent
or partner. We do so by only including respondents who have a living
parent or partner at baseline. As the difference GMM regression re-
quires at least three waves of data, we solely include individuals who
responded at least three times to the survey. Table A2 in the appendix
provides an overview of the inclusion criteria. Our sample at baseline
consists of 4,400 males and 3,528 females; across all waves we have
17,055 male and 13,693 female observations.4
Health measurement
The panel data enable us to use four complementary, validated self-
reported health outcomes. The first two measures are derived from the
SF-12 health survey, which contains questions regarding health during
the past four weeks. From this survey, we derive two subscales: the
Physical Component Summary Scale (PCS) and the Mental Component
Summary Scale (MCS).5 Both scales range from 0 to 100, a higher score
equals a better health status (Ware et al., 1995).
In addition to these general mental and physical health scores, we
use two measures that capture specific aspects of health that are par-
ticularly likely to be affected by caregiving; fatigue and depression.
Informal caregiving often leads to caregiver fatigue because caregivers
may prioritize the patient’s needs over their own (Schulz et al., 1990).
Additionally, the stress involved in caregiving (Pinquart and Sörensen,
2003), as well as the stress caused by illness of family members
(Amirkhanyan and Wolf, 2006), can lead to an increase in depressive
symptoms. Fatigue is measured using the SF-36 vitality subscale
(0–100) based on responses to four items,6 where a higher score relates
to lower fatigue/higher vitality (Ware et al., 1993).7 To measure de-
pression, we use the CES-D-10 scale (0–30). A higher score relates to
increased presence of depressive symptoms (Andresen et al., 1994).
Following scoring instructions (Andresen et al., 1994; Ware et al., 1995;
Ware et al., 1993), health scores were reported as missing in case the
respondent failed to answer any (MCS & PCS),> 1 question (CES-D-10)
or> 2 questions (vitality scale).
Measurement of informal caregiving
The main variable of interest is a binary variable indicating whether
someone provided informal care (IC) in the past year. Respondents
were asked: ‘Did you in the past 12months spend part of your time on
any of the following activities?’ When they answer ‘Giving informal
care’ affirmatively, they are considered informal caregivers.8 In the last
two waves of the survey, respondents were also asked to indicate to
whom they provided care. To analyze differences in the type of care
provided, we distinguish between spousal, parental and other types of
caregiving in subgroup analyses. Based on the 2012 and 2013 ob-
servations, we impute the type of care in the first two waves assuming
that the care recipient (parent or spouse) remains the same throughout
the years.9 In Table A3 in the appendix an overview of the number of
informal caregivers is given, specified by care recipient. As our sample
is limited to respondents aged 45–65 we do not capture the entire
caregiving population, especially spousal caregivers tend to be older
and hence underrepresented in our data. Our results might therefore
underestimate the average health effect for the full population of
caregivers, as older caregivers might be more prone to the negative
health effects of caregiving (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003).
Covariates
As explained in the methods section, we take first-differences and
control for lagged health. We furthermore estimate the family effect by
including a variable indicating whether the respondent indicated that a
spouse or close family member has become severely ill within the past
year. Furthermore, we include the following individual-level covariates:
age, age-squared, self-reported financial difficulties,10 percentile group of
standardized household income, marital status, having children living at
home, employment status,11 and whether or not the father or mother is
alive. Finally, we include wave dummies to capture time trends affecting
all respondents, including for instance any trends in formal LTC use.12
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample at baseline,
stratified by respondent caregiver status. Caregivers are more often
3We use non-public microdata which, when adhering to various conditions,
can be accessed via a secured remote access connection.
4 We consider this sample a random subsample, no large discrepancies in
observable characteristics between the subsample and total sample were de-
tected.
5 The scales consists of the following sub-scales: Physical functioning (2
questions), Role-Physical (2 questions), Bodily Pain and General Health,
Vitality, Social Functioning, Role-Emotional (2 questions) and Mental Health (2
questions).
6 The past four weeks: (1) Did you feel full of life? (2) Did you have a lot of
energy? (3) Did you feel worn out? (4) Did you feel tired?
7 Although the vitality subscale was developed as part of a broader health
measure, the subscale is used in isolation in various patient populations (e.g.
Hewlett, Dures, & Almeida, 2011).
8 Informal care (in Dutch: Mantelzorg) refers to providing non-professional
care for a person in need in your own close environment, it does not include
looking after healthy family members.
9 This assumption seems credible, between 2012 and 2013 the care recipient
changed in only 4% (spouses) and 7% (parents) of the cases.
10 This variable equals 1 when the respondent indicated that their household
is currently very short or a bit short on money.
11 Next to health effects, informal care might also affect someone's work si-
tuation. Including income and employment as control variables might therefore
bias results when these variable act as dependent variables ('bad controls') in
the model (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). However, Rellstab et al. (2018) show that,
as the Dutch LTC system is generous and comprehensive, there are no direct
employment and income effects and hence we include these control variables in
the model. When testing this decision empirically, we do not observe large
differences in our main estimations dependent on inclusion of these variables.
12 There are no differences across regions or between households in formal
care availability that we need to account for. In general, co-payments are low
and income-related and there are virtually no waiting lists for formal care use
(Mot, 2010).
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females, and have a lower health status at baseline. As expected, informal
caregivers more often have ill family members. Table A4 in the appendix
presents the descriptive statistics for the sample stratified by gender.
Health effects
The estimation results of the A-B models presented in Table 2 suggest
that informal caregiving only has a negative effect on mental health as
measured by the MCS. The effect is small compared to the mean MCS
score (only about 1%). We also observe significant family effects on
mental health: a severe illness occurring to a family member leads to a
significant decrease in the mental health score of about the same size as
the caregiving effect and to a significant increase in depressed feelings.13
Only changes in a few other covariates (i.e. having financial difficulties,
being employed, and mother alive) are associated with health changes.
The family effect is important in itself, but also because omitting it
from a regression may lead to an upward bias of the estimate of the
caregiving effect. To examine the importance of not considering the
family effect on the magnitude of the caregiving effect, we reran our
analysis while excluding the family effect. The estimated coefficients of
the health effect of informal caregiving in both models are presented in
Table 3. It shows that ignoring the family effect in these models would,
compared to our main model, yield a slightly higher estimate for the
caregiving effect for mental health scores, though the difference is not
significant. We do not find an effect for the physical health score.
The family effect and the caregiving effect differ by gender (see:
Table A5 in the appendix); both the caregiving effect and the family
effect only affect the mental health of females.14 Males, by contrast,
experience a physical health decline in response to informal caregiving.
This difference does not seem to be driven by hours spent caring, since
male and female caregivers in the sample devote roughly the same
amount of time to care.
Our A-B models rely on deeper lags of health to instrument the
lagged first-difference in health. The first stage results show the re-
levance of these instruments (Table A6): the excluded lagged levels of
health are strongly correlated with the lagged difference in health. This
is confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistics for the ex-
cluded instruments, indicating that the instruments are strong. The
Hansen (1982) J-test statistics for overidentifying restrictions provide
an indication of the validity of our instruments: for all models, we
cannot reject the null-hypothesis that all instruments are valid.15
Heterogeneous effects: subsample analyses
In order to assess whether the caregiving effect and the family effect
differ for various types of caregiving, we carry out several subsample
analyses. These subgroup analyses are of interest in themselves, but also
facilitate an easier comparison with prior studies which often focused
on subgroups only. First, we analyze whether the provision of more
informal care also leads to larger health damage. There indeed appears
to be a dose-response relationship: for individuals that start providing
at least eight hours of care per week16 (31% of the caregivers provide at
least this amount of care), the impact of informal care on mental health
and vitality is considerably larger than for the group providing less than
eight hours of care per week (Table 4).
The caregiving effect is larger when caring for a spouse instead of
someone else (Table 5). Spousal caregiving especially affects vitality
and depression scores. These effects are substantial; caregiving relates
to a change of for example more than 10% of the average CES-D-10
score. We also observe a difference in terms of the family effect; a se-
vere illness of a spouse has a negative effect on mental health and vi-
tality scores and increases depression scores, but these effects are ab-
sent when a parent or other close family member falls ill.
For all subgroup analyses, the results stratified by gender can be
found in the appendix. Tables A7 and A8 show that all effects (except
for the physical health effect) are larger for females and often sig-
nificantly different by gender.17
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of baseline sample.
Never informal
caregiver
Ever informal
caregiver
Mean SD Mean SD
1 2 3 4 3-1
Health outcomes
SF-12 physical component scale 49.27 9.75 48.82 9.98 *
SF-12 mental component scale 52.64 8.26 51.24 9.46 ***
SF-36 vitality scale 66.31 19.11 63.85 19.79 ***
CES-D-10 depression index 5.03 4.83 5.70 5.30 ***
Health family
Severe illness of spouse/family member 0.14 0.34 0.27 0.45 ***
Severe illness of spouse 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 ***
Severe illness of close family 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.41 ***
Personal characteristics
Age 53.74 5.52 53.94 5.20
Age Squared 2918.66 596.09 2936.92 562.26
Gender 0.35 0.48 0.57 0.49 ***
Married/registered partnership 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.38 ***
Children living at home 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 ***
Employed 0.89 0.32 0.85 0.35 ***
Perc. group household income 68.20 22.71 67.92 23.33
Financial difficulties 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 *
Father alive 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.47 ***
Mother alive 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.48 ***
Informal caregiving
Average care duration (# waves) 2.25 1.25 ***
Number of observations in T1 4,654 3,273
Total number of observations 17,981 12,758
SF-12 PCS and MCS and SF-36 Vitality range from 0 to 100 (lowest - highest
level of health). CES-D-10 ranges from 0 to 30. A score 10 is considered a sign
of depression. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 indicate differences between
never and ever informal care sample.
13 In additional regressions we verified whether the family effect differed
when including hours of care instead of a dummy for informal care. This turned
out not to be the case (results available upon request).
14 The differences in the caregiving effects by gender are significant for PCS,
MCS and CESD at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.05 level, respectively.
15 The difference GMM model furthermore relies on the assumption of no
serial correlation among the errors, which can be assessed using the test pro-
posed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This test focuses on finding autocorrelation
among the differenced error terms. We cannot test for second order auto-
correlation, as it requires five waves of data. In the absence of any formal test
for this assumption, we rely on Coe and Van Houtven (2009) and Roy and
Schurer (2013) who did not find any second order serial correlation of the
residuals for mental health in a similar model. We also estimated our model
using a deeper lag of health (Hit-3) instead of both Hit-3 and Hit-2, which would
solve the problem in case any second order correlation was present. Use of this
deeper lag of health hardly affected our estimates, supporting the validity of our
assumption.
16 We use the threshold of ≥8 h following the definition of informal care of
Statistics Netherlands (2016)
17 The caregiving effect of 1–7 hours of care differs by gender for PCS, MCS
and CESD at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.05 level, for intensive caregiving this dif-
ference is present for PCS and vitality at the 0.05 and 0.10 level. The difference
in the parental caregiving effect is significantly different by gender for vitality
and depression at the 0.01 and 0.10 level. The difference in the spousal car-
egiving effect by gender is significantly different for PCS, MCS and depression
at the 0.05, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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Table 2
Arellano-Bond difference GMM regressions.
A-B Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care −0.07 (0.19) −0.45** (0.22) −0.49 (0.35) 0.14 (0.10)
Severe illness spouse/family 0.14 (0.15) −0.43*** (0.17) −0.29 (0.27) 0.16** (0.08)
Lagged health 0.10**** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.09** (0.02)
Employed 0.46 (0.29) −0.23 (0.31) −1.74*** (0.54) −0.01 (0.16)
Financial difficulties −0.22 (0.21) −0.18 (0.25) −1.14*** (0.40) 0.32*** (0.12)
Perc. group household income −0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00)
Age 0.43 (0.53) −0.68 (0.54) −0.20 (0.97) 0.29 (0.27)
Age Squared/100 −0.47 (0.48) 0.61 (0.48) 0.08 (0.86) −0.23 (0.24)
Married/Registered partnership −0.58 (0.54) 1.18 (0.77) 1.26 (1.11) −0.65* (0.36)
Children living at home −0.07 (0.30) −0.30 (0.33) −0.48 (0.56) 0.14 (0.16)
Mother Alive 0.10 (0.39) −0.98** (0.43) −0.84 (0.70) 0.06 (0.20)
Father Alive 0.54 (0.40) −0.21 (0.51) −0.22 (0.74) 0.21 (0.22)
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.50 (0.78) 0.96 (0.61) 3.2 (0.21) 2.86 (0.24)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Depending on the model that is estimated,
lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding dependent variable.
Table 3
Coefficients caregiving effect in model with or without family effect.
A-B Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care (in model with family effect) −0.07 (0.19) −0.45** (0.22) −0.49 (0.35) 0.13 (0.10)
Informal care (in model without family effect) −0.05 (0.19) −0.49** (0.22) −0.52 (0.34) 0.15 (0.10)
Table 4
A-B estimates for subgroups stratified by caregiving intensity.
A-B intensive care Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
1–7h of informal care −0.09 (0.20) −0.32 (0.23) −0.26 (0.37) 0.13 (0.11)
≥8h of informal care 0.01 (0.29) −0.89*** (0.32) −1.25** (0.52) 0.17 (0.15)
Illness family member 0.14 (0.15) −0.42** (0.17) −0.27 (0.27) 0.16** (0.08)
Hansen J-test 0.5 (0.78) 0.98 (0.61) 3.2 (0.20) 2.85 (0.24)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, standardized
household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Table 5
A-B estimates for informal care to various types of care receivers.
A-B different caregivers Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care to spouse −0.82 (0.61) −1.05 (0.73) −1.85* (1.04) 0.71** (0.28)
Informal care to parent 0.02 (0.26) −0.50* (0.30) −0.09 (0.46) 0.06 (0.15)
Informal care to other person 0.01 (0.28) −0.29 (0.29) −0.56 (0.49) 0.08 (0.13)
Spouse severely ill −0.18 (0.16) −1.04** (0.43) −1.51** (0.65) 0.45** (0.19)
Close family member severely ill 0.18 (0.16) −0.22 (0.18) 0.00 (0.29) 0.10 (0.08)
Hansen J-test 0.53 (0.47) 0.95 (0.33) 3.15 (0.08) 2.85 (0.09)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, financial diffi-
culties, standardized household income, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Robustness analyses
Results for several tests of robustness of our model estimates are
presented in the appendix. To test whether the GMM model is able to
overcome the dynamic panel bias, we first compare the A-B output with
OLS and FE estimation results (Tables A9 and A10). As OLS (not con-
trolling for individual fixed effects) and FE (suffering from dynamic
panel bias), lead to biases in different directions, the estimates of both
models represent upper and lower bounds for our autoregressive coef-
ficient (Bond, 2002). Our A-B estimate of lagged health is indeed
bounded by the OLS and FE estimates. The estimated caregiving effect
and family effect in both models do not differ substantially from the A-B
estimates.
Second, in all our models, we rely on self-reported information re-
garding health shocks of family members. This variable could be prone
to justification bias: caregivers may justify their decision to provide
care (and possibly their withdrawal from the labor market) by over-
stating the need of their family member (Bound, 1991). To rule this out,
we rerun all models using a variable indicating the occurrence of a
negative health shock of a family member (i.e. parent or spouse) as
obtained from administrative data. For this test, we use a variable in-
dicating whether a parent or spouse has become eligible for formal LTC
in the current year because this indicates a substantial health decline
that causes functional limitations and thus a need for both professional
and informal help. The estimated coefficients for the family effect do
not differ much between both indicators, except for the coefficient for
the MCS which becomes insignificant and positive (Table A11). We use
severe illness instead of LTC eligibility in the main analyses, as this
variable covers a broader set of health problems.
Furthermore, our model might overestimate the caregiving effect
when our indicator of the family effect does not capture all family
health shocks. To test this, we include a selection of variables regarding
the health of spouses and parents from administrative data. These ad-
ministrative data include annual outpatient prescription drug use at the
ATC 3 level, eligibility for publicly funded formal home care and nur-
sing home care, and various types of health insurance spending such as
GP care, hospital care and nursing care. As these data contain a very
large number of potential indicators that would reduce any omitted
variable bias, we use LASSO regression to select the most relevant
variables (Belloni et al., 2012). The caregiving effect on mental health
persists after adding these additional health variables, which suggests
that the effect in the main analysis is robust to more extensive control
for the family effect (Table A12). As including multiple measures of
family health shocks means that the family effect is no longer easy to
interpret, we rely on the health shock indicator in our main models.
Finally, we test the robustness of our results using a different
methodology. Instead of the A-B method, we use a bias-correction es-
timation method to correct for the dynamic panel bias. For this test we
make use of the Stata command xtlsdvc (Bruno, 2005). The estimated
caregiving and family effect closely match our initial results (Table
A13). We prefer to rely on difference-GMMmethods in our main models
as it is better suited towards models where the number of observations
is large (Bruno, 2005).
Discussion and conclusion
Illness and frailty may have health consequences for individuals
who care for and care about spouses and parents in bad health, i.e. the
caregiving effect and the family effect. Most of the literature to date did
not distinguish between these two. Using a Dutch panel survey of re-
spondents aged 45–65, we find evidence for both effects, particularly on
mental health. Our estimates of the caregiving effect on mental health
are smaller than those of previous studies such as De Zwart et al. (2017)
and Schmitz and Westphal (2015). For example Schmitz and Westphal
(2015) reported an impact of caregiving on mental health of −2 on the
MCS for female caregivers, in contrast to −0.8 in this study.
Our findings contribute to the literature on informal caregiving in a
number of ways. First, they highlight the importance of estimating the
family effect separately: the onset of an illness of a family member has
spillover effects to both caregiving and non-caregiving family members
that can add to the burden of providing informal care. Thus, con-
sidering the family effect is important, even though in this study con-
trolling for the family effect does not have implications for the esti-
mated caregiving effect itself. Additionally, ignoring the family effect
and using health of a family member as an instrument for informal
caregiving is problematic because the direct negative effect of the
health of a family member on the caregiver’s health means that the
exclusion restriction of the instrument is likely to be violated.
Second, we conducted interesting subgroup analyses. These indicate
that female caregivers experience larger caregiving effects on mental
health than male caregivers. Explanations could be that females are
more often the primary caregiver and more likely to experience social
pressure to become a caregiver (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003). The car-
egiving effect is also especially large for spousal caregivers. This finding
may derive from a different intensity of caregiving; descriptive statistics
show that spousal caregivers often provide more hours of informal care
than other types of caregivers.
The findings of significant negative caregiving effects and family
effects on mental health indicate that policymakers who seek to miti-
gate the negative spillovers from illness of an elderly person should
focus on relieving the burden of caregiving activities but should not
neglect the other family members. Furthermore, the findings show that
the impact of caregiving is not the same for all subgroups of caregivers.
Especially female and spousal caregivers experience large negative
mental health effects of caregiving. Policymakers could specifically aim
to support these groups of caregivers with targeted interventions.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge comments on earlier versions of
this article by Johan Bonekamp, Rudy Douven, Agnès Gramain, Sara
Rellstab and Marianne Tenand. We also thank participants of various
seminars and conferences for useful comments and discussion, and TNO
and Statistics Netherlands for providing access to survey and adminis-
trative data. This study received financial support from the Network for
Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement. Grant: Optimal saving and
insurance for old age: The role of public-long term care insurance.
Declaration of interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Appendix
J. Bom, et al. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 14 (2019) 100196
6
Ta
bl
eA
1
Ov
erv
iew
of
lit
era
tu
re
reg
ard
ing
he
alt
h
eff
ec
ts
of
inf
or
ma
lc
are
giv
ing
ac
co
un
tin
gf
or
en
do
ge
ne
ity
of
ca
reg
ivi
ng
.
Au
th
or
s
Da
ta
so
ur
ce
Ca
re
rec
ipi
en
t
Sa
mp
le
(sa
mp
le
siz
e)
He
alt
h
me
as
ur
e
Fo
cu
so
n
fam
ily
eff
ec
t
Es
tim
ato
r
Ins
tru
me
nt
al
va
ria
ble
Re
su
lts
Co
ea
nd
Va
n
Ho
ut
ve
n
(2
00
9)
HR
S,
19
92
–2
00
4
(7
wa
ve
s)
Pa
ren
t
Ma
les
an
df
em
ale
sa
ge
d5
0–
64
,
ha
vin
go
nly
am
oth
er
ali
ve
(1
46
7c
ur
ren
tc
are
giv
ers
)
Di
sti
nc
tio
nm
arr
ied
/si
ng
le
Me
nt
al
he
alt
h
(C
ES
-D
8)
;P
hy
sic
al
he
alt
h
(se
lf-
rep
or
ted
he
alt
h
on
a5
-po
int
,
dia
gn
os
ed
he
art
co
nd
iti
on
&
blo
od
pr
ess
ur
e).
–
IV
,A
rel
lan
o-
Bo
nd
(1
)D
ea
th
of
ap
are
nt
(2
)S
ibl
ing
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s
(1
)C
on
tin
ue
dc
are
giv
ing
:
↑C
ES
-D
-8
(m
arr
ied
ma
les
an
d
fem
ale
s)
↑H
ea
rt
co
nd
iti
on
(si
ng
le
ma
les
)
lik
eli
ho
od
of
rep
or
tin
g
ex
ce
lle
nt
or
ve
ry
go
od
he
alt
h(
↓
ma
rri
ed
fem
ale
s,
↑m
arr
ied
ma
les
)
(2
)I
nit
ial
ca
reg
ivi
ng
:
↑C
ES
-D
-8
(m
arr
ied
fem
ale
s)
Do
et
al.
(2
01
5)
Ko
rea
nL
SA
,
20
06
–2
01
0(
3
wa
ve
s)
Pa
ren
t(
in-
law
)
W
om
en
wi
th
liv
ing
pa
ren
t(i
n
law
),
ag
ed
45
+
,(
25
28
da
ug
ht
ers
-in
-la
w
&
41
08
da
ug
ht
ers
)
Pa
in
aff
ec
tin
gd
ail
ya
cti
vit
ies
;F
air
or
po
or
sel
f-r
ate
d
he
alt
h;
An
yo
ut
pa
tie
nt
ca
re
us
e;
OO
P
sp
en
din
gf
or
ou
tpa
tie
nt
ca
re;
An
y
pr
esc
rip
tio
n
dr
ug
us
e;
OO
P
sp
en
din
g
pr
esc
rip
tio
n
dr
ug
s.
Cl
aim
to
av
oid
fam
ily
eff
ec
tb
yf
oc
us
ing
on
ph
ys
ica
lh
ea
lth
an
d
ca
re
for
pa
ren
ts-
in-
law
IV
-2S
LS
,I
V-
pr
ob
it
AD
Ll
im
ita
tio
ns
of
th
e
mo
th
er(
-in
-la
w)
an
d
fat
he
r(-
in-
law
)
↑P
ain
aff
ec
tin
gd
ail
ya
cti
vit
ies
,
He
alt
h
Se
lf-
rat
ed
as
po
or
,O
OP
ou
tpa
tie
nt
ca
re
(d
au
gh
ter
s&
da
ug
ht
ers
-in
-la
w)
↑A
ny
ou
tpa
tie
nt
ca
re
us
e,
An
y
pr
esc
rip
tio
n
dr
ug
us
e
(d
au
gh
ter
s)
He
ge
r(
20
16
)
SH
AR
E,
20
04
–2
01
3(
4
wa
ve
s)
Pa
ren
t
W
om
en
an
dm
en
ag
ed
50
–7
0
(3
66
9w
om
en
&
27
52
me
n)
EU
RO
-D
de
pr
ess
ion
sca
le,
ind
ica
tor
wh
eth
er
so
me
on
es
uff
ers
fro
m
4o
rm
or
e
de
pr
ess
ive
sy
mp
tom
s.
Es
tim
ate
fam
ily
eff
ec
t
by
ad
din
gh
ea
lth
of
pa
ren
ta
sv
ari
ab
le
to
mo
de
l
IV
-FE
Ind
ica
tor
of
wh
eth
er
on
ep
are
nt
is
ali
ve
↑E
ur
o-D
,4
+
de
pr
ess
ive
sy
mp
tom
s(
fem
ale
s)
Fa
mi
ly
eff
ec
ts
ma
ll
Va
nd
en
Be
rg
et
al.
(2
01
4)
HI
LD
A,
20
01
–2
01
1(
11
wa
ve
s)
Pa
rtn
er,
pa
ren
t
(in
-la
w)
or
rel
ati
ve
Ag
ed
16
+
(2
3,2
85
ind
ivi
du
als
)
Ind
ivi
du
al
su
bje
cti
ve
we
llb
ein
g
–
FE
-or
de
red
log
it
NA
↓W
ell
-be
ing
Sc
hm
itz
an
d
W
est
ph
al
(2
01
5)
GS
OE
P,
20
02
–2
01
0
Un
kn
ow
n
W
om
en
ag
ed
18
+
,(
31
,17
7
pe
rso
n-y
ea
ro
bs
erv
ati
on
sa
t
t=
0)
SF
-12
v2
MC
S&
PC
S
–
Ma
tch
ed
reg
res
sio
n
NA
Sh
or
tt
erm
:↓
SF
12
Me
nt
al
Co
mp
on
en
tS
ca
le
Br
en
na
an
dD
iN
ov
i
(2
01
6)
SH
AR
E,
20
04
–2
00
7(
2
wa
ve
s)
Pa
ren
t
W
om
en
ag
ed
50
–7
5(
N
=
39
36
)
Eu
ro
-D
de
pr
ess
ion
sca
le
–
Ma
tch
ed
reg
res
sio
n
NA
↑E
ur
o-D
(fe
ma
les
,S
ou
th
ern
Eu
ro
pe
an
co
un
tri
es)
De
Zw
art
et
al.
(2
01
7)
SH
AR
E,
20
04
,
20
06
,2
01
0,
20
13
Pa
rtn
er
Ma
les
an
df
em
ale
sa
ge
d5
0+
(N
=
10
,47
2)
Pr
esc
rip
tio
nd
ru
gs
us
ag
e;
nu
mb
er
of
do
cto
r
vis
its
in
th
ep
as
t1
2m
on
th
s;
EU
RO
-D
de
pr
ess
ion
sca
le;
sel
f-p
erc
eiv
ed
he
alt
h.
–
Ma
tch
ed
reg
res
sio
n
NA
Sh
or
tt
erm
:
↑E
ur
o-D
,↓
sel
f-r
ep
or
ted
he
alt
h;
↑p
res
cri
pti
on
dr
ug
us
e
(fe
ma
les
),
↑d
oc
tor
vis
its
(fe
ma
les
)
Fo
rt
he
de
pr
ess
ion
rel
ate
dh
ea
lth
sca
les
(C
ES
-D
an
dE
ur
o-D
),
an
inc
rea
se
in
th
eh
ea
lth
sca
le
ref
ers
to
an
eg
ati
ve
he
alt
hc
ha
ng
e(
an
inc
rea
se
in
de
pr
ess
ive
fee
lin
gs
).
Fo
rt
he
SF
-12
an
ds
elf
-re
po
rte
dh
ea
lth
,a
ni
nc
rea
se
ref
ers
to
ap
os
iti
ve
he
alt
h
ch
an
ge
.
J. Bom, et al. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 14 (2019) 100196
7
Table A2
Sample size and sample selection criteria.
Inclusion criteria Overall sample (%
of total)
Total respondents at T1 (2010) 15,118
Agreement to be linked to administrative data 13,672 (90.4)
Identified in administrative data 13,398 (88.6)
Did not submit survey twice in same wave 13,218 (87.4)
Having at least one parent alive and/or having a spouse
(married or registered partnership) at T1
10,855 (71.8)
Fully completed≥3 surveys 7,928 (52.6)
Total number of respondents included T1 7,928
Table A3
Number of informal caregivers, specified by care recipient.
Males Females
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total informal caregivers (includes other care recipients) 653 699 697 867 1156 1202 1267 1168
Started providing informal care 277 320 322 310 337 304
Stopped providing informal care 231 228 168 263 270 253
Average number of hours of informal care per week 8.24 8.19 8.48 8.13 9.01 8.47 8.53 7.97
Providing informal care to close family member (parent) 238a 292a 394 433 625a 686a 804 732
Providing informal care to spouse 94a 112a 140 174 114a 128a 134 131
a: Imputed based on care recipient in 2012–2013.
Table A4
Descriptive statistics of sample at baseline.
Male Female
Never Informal caregiver Ever Informal caregiver Never Informal caregiver Ever Informal caregiver
Health outcomes Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
SF-12 physical component scale 50.35 8.39 50.35 8.52 47.28 11.59 47.67 10.81
SF-12 mental component scale 53.15 7.69 51.72 9.26 *** 51.70 9.15 50.88 9.59 **
SF-36 vitality scale 68.24 17.87 66.38 19.58 *** 62.79 20.73 61.96 19.74
CES-D-10 depression scale 4.61 4.49 5.17 5.15 *** 5.80 5.31 6.09 5.38
Health family
Severe illness spouse/family 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.43 *** 0.14 0.35 0.29 0.45 ***
Severe illness spouse 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.27 *** 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 ***
Severe illness close family 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.38 *** 0,12 0,32 0,25 0,43 ***
Personal characteristics
Age 54.05 5.49 54.54 5.07 *** 53.18 5.54 53.50 5.24
Age Squared 2951.4 594.2 2999.9 551.3 *** 2858.9 595.1 2890.2 565.9
Married/registered partnership 0.89 0.31 0.88 0.33 *** 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.41 ***
Children living at home 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50 *** 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49
Employed 0.93 0.26 0.91 0.29 *** 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39
Perc. group household income 69.08 21.83 69.16 22.57 66.58 24.14 67.00 23.84
Financial difficulties 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 *** 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
Father alive 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.69 0.46 ***
Mother alive 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 ** 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.48 ***
Informal caregiving
Average care duration (# waves) 2.02 1.14 *** 2.42 1.22 ***
Number of observations in T1 3,006 1,394 1,648 1,880
SF-12 PCS and MCS and SF-36 Vitality range from 0 to 100 (lowest - highest level of health). CES-D-10 ranges from 0 to 30, a score 10 is considered a sign of
depression. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 indicate differences between never and ever IC sample.
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Table A5
A-B estimates for males and females.
A-B Males Females
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care −0.56** (0.27) −0.06 (0.29) −0.22 (0.48) −0.09 (0.14) 0.34 (0.27) −0.81** (0.32) −0.79 (0.49) 0.34** (0.14)
Severe illness close family 0.11 (0.19) −0.37 (0.23) −0.45 (0.35) 0.15 (0.11) 0.19 (0.23) −0.51** (0.25) −0.14 (0.41) 0.19 (0.12)
Hansen J-test 0.67 (0.71) 0.18 (0.91) 3.50 (0.18) 0.84 (0.66) 0.18 (0.91) 0.97 (0.62) 0.93 (0.63) 2.71 (0.26)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, standardized
household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Table A6
First stage statistics of A-B estimations.
1st Stage Both genders
1.Lag Δ SF-12
PCS
1.Lag Δ SF-12 MCS 1.Lag Δ SF-36 vitality 1.Lag Δ CES-D-10 depression
2.Lag Health indicatora −0.25*** (0.01) −0.46*** (0.01) −0.30*** (0.01) −0.33*** (0.01)
2.Lag Health indicator −0.34*** (0.01) −0.48*** (0.02) −0.47*** (0.01) −0.52*** (0.01)
3.Lag Health indicator 0.13*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.01) 0.32*** (0.02)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 446.29 726.89 755.6 624.7
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
a. As the instrument matrix is not collapsed, we have separate instruments dependent on whether only the 2nd lag, or both the 2nd and 3rd lag of health can be used
as instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. These regressions also include: informal care, severe illness of spouse/family member, age, age2, financial
difficulties, children at home, married, employed, financial difficulties, standardized household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Depending on the model that is estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding dependent variable.
Table A7
A-B estimates for higher intensity informal caregivers.
A-B Intensive care Males Females
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
1–7 h of informal care −0.54* (0.30) 0.10 (0.32) −0.16 (0.53) −0.18 (0.16) 0.29 (0.28) −0.69** (0.33) −0.47 (0.52) 0.37** (0.15)
≥8 h of informal care −0.62 (0.38) −0.52 (0.45) −0.39 (0.71) 0.17 (0.23) 0.54 (0.42) −1.25*** (0.45) −1.95*** (0.74) 0.25 (0.20)
Severe illness close family 0.11 (0.19) −0.36 (0.23) −0.45 (0.35) 0.14 (0.11) 0.18 (0.23) −0.50** (0.25) −0.12 (0.41) 0.19 (0.12)
Hansen J-test 0.67 (0.72) 0.18 (0.91) 3.51 (0.17) 0.85 (0.65) 0.18 (0.92) 0.97 (0.62) 0.95 (0.62) 2.73 (0.26)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, standardized
household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Table A8
A-B estimates informal care to various types of care receivers.
A-B Males Females
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care to spouse −1.59** (0.74) −0.17 (0.84) 0.92 (1.32) 0.37 (0.40) 0.15 (1.02) −2.22* (1.27) −5.47*** (1.56) 1.20*** (0.37)
Informal care to parent −0.66* (0.34) 0.15 (0.39) 0.17 (0.62) −0.21 (0.20) 0.55 (0.36) −0.98** (0.43) −0.28 (0.66) 0.28 (0.20)
Informal care to other person −0.20 (0.37) −0.21 (0.40) −0.78 (0.70) −0.11 (0.20) 0.16 (0.40) −0.39 (0.42) −0.56 (0.68) 0.26 (0.18)
Severe illness spouse −0.28 (0.44) −0.77 (0.55) −1.20 (0.84) 0.18 (0.26) −0.03 (0.50) −1.39** (0.68) −1.89* (0.99) 0.70** (0.28)
Severe illness close family 0.15 (0.20) −0.20 (0.24) −0.28 (0.39) 0.17 (0.12) 0.21 (0.24) −0.25 (0.25) 0.26 (0.43) 0.06 (0.12)
Hansen J-test 0.73 (0.39) 0.16 (0.69) 3.36 (0.07) 0.83 (0.36) 0.17 (0.68) 1.59 (0.21) 1.17 (0.28) 2.74 (0.10)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, financial diffi-
culties, standardized household income, wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table A9
OLS estimates of main model.
OLS Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care −0.24** (0.10) −0.31*** (0.11) −0.57*** (0.19) 0.18*** (0.06)
Severe illness spouse/family −0.22* (0.12) −0.80*** (0.13) −0.90*** (0.22) 0.34*** (0.07)
Lagged health 0.71*** (0.01) 0.53*** (0.01) 0.69*** (0.01) 0.63*** (0.01)
Age −1.38*** (0.16) −1.01*** (0.18) −2.55*** (0.32) 0.65*** (0.10)
Age squared/100 1.30*** (0.15) 1.01*** (0.16) 2.47*** (0.28) −0.62*** (0.09)
Married/Registered partnership 0.13 (0.12) 0.76*** (0.15) 1.21*** (0.25) −0.47*** (0.08)
Children living at home 0.42*** (0.09) 0.05 (0.11) 0.50** (0.19) −0.08 (0.06)
Employed 2.63*** (0.12) 1.49*** (0.15) 2.77*** (0.26) −1.05*** (0.08)
Financial difficulties −0.63*** (0.12) −1.05*** (0.14) −2.34*** (0.23) 0.77*** (0.07)
Perc. group household income 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) −0.01*** (0.00)
Mother Alive 0.17* (0.09) 0.08 (0.10) 0.24 (0.17) −0.10* (0.05)
Father Alive 0.29* (0.09) −0.02 (0.11) 0.19 (0.19) −0.06 (0.05)
N 21,539 21,539 22,789 22,787
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Depending on the model that is estimated,
lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding dependent variable.
Table A10
Fixed effects estimates of main model.
Fixed Effects Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care −0.07 (0.17) −0.34* (0.18) −0.47 (0.30) 0.15* (0.08)
Severe illness spouse/family 0.15 (0.13) −0.35** (0.15) −0.23 (0.24) 0.14* (0.07)
Lagged health −0.25*** (0.01) −0.26*** (0.01) −0.24*** (0.01) −0.27*** (0.01)
Age 0.37 (0.54) −0.47 (0.56) −0.45 (1.01) 0.36 (0.28)
Age squared/100 −0.43 (0.47) 0.63 (0.49) 0.74 (0.88) −0.38 (0.24)
Married/Registered partnership −0.55 (0.50) 1.73** (0.60) 1.85** (0.93) −1.11*** (0.31)
Children living at home 0.19 (0.26) −0.46* (0.28) −0.65 (0.48) 0.10 (0.13)
Employed 0.39 (0.25) 0.22 (0.26) −1.30*** (0.48) −0.16 (0.13)
Financial difficulties −0.26 (0.18) −0.42*** (0.21) −1.46*** (0.35) 0.43*** (0.10)
Perc. group household income −0.00* (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Mother Alive −0.32 (0.35) −0.48 (0.34) −0.49 (0.60) 0.09 (0.18)
Father Alive 0.60 (0.38) −0.12 (0.45) 0.32 (0.72) 0.07 (0.20)
N 21,539 21,539 22,789 22,787
Unique individuals 7,906 7,906 7,957 7,958
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Depending on the model that is estimated,
lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding dependent variable.
Table A11
Robustness check, using LTC eligibility as health shock.
A-B Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality CES-D-10 depression
Informal care −0.01 (0.19) −0.46** (0.22) −0.50 (0.35) 0.12 (0.10)
LTC-eligibility −0.34 (0.22) 0.33 (0.28) 0.13 (0.43) 0.26** (0.13)
Hansen J-test 0.5 (0.78) 1.09 (0.58) 2.80 (0.25) 3.08 (0.22)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,485 13,485 14,657 14,656
Unique individuals 7,376 7,376 7,830 7,831
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, married, children at home, employed, financial diffi-
culties, standardized household income and wave dummies. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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